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Abstract 
 
This article explores the workings of Reputational Dialogues (RD) (as a form of 
organizational discourse); within the setting of a UK NHS hospital that has encountered 
disaster. The disaster in question took place at the Bristol Royal Infirmary (BRI), circa 
1984-1995; and is thought to have incurred the deaths of 34 ‘special heart babies’.  The 
article explores patterns of RD utilization associated with the tragedy. Transcripts from 
the hearings of an inquiry into the disaster are used to access these patterns– if within 
specific limits and constraints that are discussed in the article. The article seeks to 
comment on the workings of RDs within the BRI disaster setting and considers, 
tentatively, how these dialogues may have helped to institutionalize dominant and 
(counter-cultural beliefs) about the BRI and its reputation as a provider of cardiovascular 
care to young children. Overall, the article contributes to organization theory by 
beginning the process of observing the institutionalization of RD and its by-products, as 
organizational phenomena.  
 
 
 
Descriptors: Reputation effects, the medical profession, organizational crisis, 
institutionalization, discourse analysis. 
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Making Sense of Tragedy: The ‘Reputational’ Antecedents of a Hospital Disaster 
 
 
Introduction 
Over the past two decades or more, the United Kingdom’s National Health Service (UK 
NHS) has transitioned through several distinctive, if fad-driven, ‘eras’ of New Public 
Management (NPM) reform (see: Ferlie et al. 1996). The nature of these reforms are 
extremely well documented, as are the organizational discourses, doctrines and 
controversies they have created (see most recently: Davis and Thomas 2004; Iedema et al. 
2004; Mueller et al. 2004). 
During the same time frame, the NHS has weathered a series of momentous 
disasters, of which the BRI tragedy, the Alder-Hey and BRI tissue retention scandal; and 
the Shipman murder case have created the most public disquiet. Despite the wide spread 
coverage these disasters have received journalistically, and the numerous reports, 
inquests, court cases, and judicial inquiries they have generated, such disasters remain 
palpably under-analysed as organizational phenomena.  
 This article contributes to a growing body of research within organization theory 
that seeks to question the efficacy and safety of the NPM project; and understand the 
causes of organizational disasters and failures within NPM and UK governmental settings 
(see for example: Smith 2003; Clarence 2002; and Brown and Jones 2000). Following 
this introduction, the remainder of the article seeks to ‘reanalyse’ the BRI disaster, 
building on previous normative studies of the case and its consequences (Weick and 
Sutcliffe 2003; Aylin et al. 2001). However, this reanalysis is performed with some 
important theoretical considerations in mind that are not at first obviously connected with 
the tragedy, and the study of health disasters, per se.  
 Here, an attempt is made to observe the workings of the Reputation Effect (RE), 
as a social and organizational institution (or mechanism of compliance and conformity – 
see ostensibly Barley and Tolbert 1997); and the outplay of its multiple incarnations (n= 
4) within the context of the Bristol Royal Infirmary (BRI) disaster. The BRI tragedy took 
many years to unfold (c.1984-1995) and, upon its disclosure, represented something of a 
cause celebre for the British medical establishment. It is now thought to have claimed the 
lives of 34 infants and neo-natal ‘special heart babies’, referred to the hospital for 
complex open heart surgery (see: Aylin et al. 2001). The relevance of the BRI tragedy to 
the study of REs, may, at first, appear to be somewhat tangential. However, it is clear 
from reading the report of inquiry into the disaster (see: CM5207 2001– referred to 
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hereafter as the ‘Kennedy Report’) that reputation played a major part in the construction 
of this tragic narrative, and its disastrous consequences.  
 Tentatively, the argument is put forward in this article is that REs exerted 
important influences over the sensemaking and decision-taking of actors in the tragedy 
(Weick 1993; Weick and Sutcliffe 2003). A decision to act or withhold action, was, it is 
contended, often attenuated with beliefs about reputation, and in particular, dominant 
perceptions (and persistent images) of the BRI’s reputation as a specialist centre for 
cardiovascular surgery and medicine. Within the story, one can note, shifts in this 
dominant institution (Barley and Tolbert 1997). To begin with, the BRI is seen as a 
laggard within the specialism; but one with the potential to “shine as a star” (see: 
transcript for Day 13 of the BRI Inquiry – annexe to the ‘Kennedy Report’ 2001).  As 
time wears on, and new medical and surgical personnel are recruited to the BRI, one sees 
a questioning of this logic, and worst still, concerns arising within the new professional 
corps that practices not only lag behind, but are potentially dangerous and putting the 
lives of young children at higher risk than was the norm (Aylin et al. 2001). 
 The ‘renalyses’ of the case expedited within this article, therefore focuses on what 
can be learnt from the BRI story about the nature of RE institutionalization; and changes 
to the RE, as an institution, over the course of the tragedy. The article focuses on 
identifying patterns of RE utilization within witness transcripts from the public inquiry 
into the disaster (the ‘Kennedy Report’ 2001). It is argued from this, that as an 
organizational institution, the RE arises in myriad incarnations, but that these diverse 
patterns of utilization are underpinned by ‘production processes’ that share similar 
processual features (Barley and Tolbert 1997; Phillips et al. 2004). An attempt is made, 
further on in the article, to map these processes based on insights from the BRI case, and 
specifically, witness transcripts from the public inquiry that followed its disclosure (c. 
1998-2001).  
 Following a discussion of the data, and what it reveals, the article explores some 
wider themes the case raises for understanding REs, their composition, institutionalization 
and role in augmenting actions (and inactions). The study is situated within organizational 
institutional theory (as one might expect) but draws ostensibly upon the work of 
institutional theorists seeking to understand the part enacted by discourse and language in 
the shaping of institutions that foreground action (Phillips et al. 2004; Barley and Tolbert 
1997). It is argued that REs arise from, and are the outcomes and by-products of, complex 
webs of discursive exchange between organizational actors (Barley and Tolbert 1997). It 
is my contention, furthermore, that where REs are concerned, talk plays a vital part in 
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their social construction and institutionalization (Phillips et al. 2004). This is because REs 
are crafted principally upon the exchange of ‘subjective’ stories, impressions, opinions, 
myths and gossip about extant parties (Bromley 1993). Over time, and with 
dissemination, these subjectivities acquire objective values, enter into objective 
discussion, and become taken for granted as inherently truthful, or stories which are seen 
to be close to the truth (Barley and Tolbert 1997). It is at the moment of being taken for 
granted that reputational stories and images become institutionalized and generate effects. 
These effects work alongside other perceptual factors to encourage actors down particular 
paths of action and causation, with sometimes dangerous results.   
 In arguing the above, the article seeks to contribute primarily to understandings of 
the role discourse and discursive practices play in the institutionalization (or 
naturalization) of hegemonically taken-for-granted beliefs and interpretations (Phillips et 
al. 2004). In a concluding note, the article also offers some reflections on implications for 
disaster theory. 
 The article is divided into four further sections. The next section explores the 
theoretical background to the study and its relevance to organization theory. Section two 
considers, in more depth, how and why the BRI case is pertinent to the study of REs. This 
is then followed by a description of the methodology, and a results section synthesizing 
the main findings of the fieldwork. The article concludes by distilling observations of 
relevance to organization theory, institution theory and knowledge of disasters.   
 
 
The Reputation Effect: An Institution in Need of  ‘Processual Analysis’ 
For many years now, social and institutional theorists have been enthralled by the elixir of 
the RE, and its mythical fate-determining power within markets (Raub and Weesie 1990; 
Montgomery 1998). In studying this elixir, social and institutional economists have 
focused their attentions primarily upon the exogenous social and economic conditions 
that encourage organizations to develop formidable and exalted reputations (“for 
excellence”); and in so doing, create for themselves unassailable market dominance (see 
also: Wilson 1985).  This body of work has the search for success formulas at its core, 
and is strongly associated with the institutional literature on mimetic isomorphism (Strang 
and Macy 2001).  
 The social component to this form of RE analysis focuses largely upon 
interpersonal networking, and the role this plays in the augmentation of REs – particularly 
ones that are favourable to organizations. REs are normatively seen by social and 
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institutional economists as an epiphenomena of embeddedness - or a social phenomena 
that arises from the sharing of information between actors (Granovetter 1985; Raub and 
Weesie 1990; Bromley 1993). Within the embeddedness approach, actors are seen to 
utilize knowledge of reputation, to for example, determine transactional risks, and assess 
whether a fellow actor in a market is trustworthy (Granovetter 1985). 
 Over a twenty year period, a great deal of effort has been invested by both social 
and institutional economists such as Wilson (1985); Raub and Weesie (1990); and 
Montgomery (1998); in mathematically modelling and predicting the impact REs have on 
the behaviour of organizations, and organizational actors in networks and markets. In 
Raub and Weese’s (1990) simulation, they show how, by altering the degree of 
embeddedness - or the extent to which actors are socially bound to one another - patterns 
of RE utilization change. Thus, for instance, in a low trust, low bond situation, the 
significance of REs are magnified exponentially (in the manner of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma – see also: Montgomery 1998).  
 Whilst enriching our understanding of the links between REs and calculative, 
normative-rational understandings of human decision-making, and risk and trust; actors in 
these abstract simulations remain somewhat anonymous and voiceless. We can observe 
the outplay of social interactions with them, but in a fairly stilted and didactic way, that 
does not normally explore the construction (and / or structuration) of actions beyond the 
level of ‘actor A provides actor B with reputational information, actor B then considers 
how to act…’ (Barley and Tolbert 1997).  To the qualitative researcher, these models are 
thus highly dissatisfying – we are left with a significant interpretive vacuum, particularly 
in terms of how REs are created as institutions and diffused within and between 
organizations and networks of  interpersonal actors.  
 Clearly, the REs depicted in these mathematical simulations cannot emerge 
without talk, dialogue, story, metaphor and imagery – actors must, after all, ‘exchange’ 
what they know of another’s reputation using words and by assembling verbal pictures; 
and using analogies (Morgan 1986). The RE, is thus, arguably an institution framed by 
talk and conversational dialogues, saturated with emotions, subjectivities, images, stories 
and metaphor (Morgan 1986; see also, indirectly, Bromley 1993). It might, on these 
grounds be plausible to view the RE as a discursively fashioned institution (Phillips et al. 
2004).  
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Discourse and Institutionalization 
Increasingly, institutionalization - or the processes that encourage practices and beliefs to 
become taken for granted and ‘naturalized’ within organizational settings (Barley and 
Tolbert 1997) - is being seen as a discursive cycle; in which action, talk and text are 
inextricably interwoven (Phillips et al. 2004). This represents something of a departure 
from normative theories of institutionalization which have tended to focus on the links 
between institutions (as mechanisms of conformity and compliance) structuration (how 
behaviours are ordered and how they conform to prevailing institutions); enactment (via 
scripts or interpretative schemas that codify action); and action itself (see, ostensibly, 
Barley and Tolbert 1997; also Zucker 1991). This work revisits questions that have long 
since pervaded the economic and institutional literatures concerning the relationship 
between structure and agency; and how people come to ‘internalize’ institutions; enact, 
and reframe them (Barley and Tolbert 1997).  
 In a recent paper, Phillips et al. (2004) have returned to Barley and Tolbert’s work 
in an effort to bring discourse into the theoretical foreground of the institutionalization 
debate. Discourse, they argue, has always been present in theories of institutionalization - 
which see institutionalization fundamentally as an iterative, ongoing process - it has just 
not been given enough prominence. Thus for example, Barley and Tolbert (1997: 96-97) 
refer at one point to institutions as a form of grammar, but develop this analogy no 
further. More indicatively perhaps, Barley and Tolbert bring institutions, structuration, 
and action together around the notion of scripts – which even if not committed to the 
page, represent a form of ‘text’.  
 Drawing on discourse analysis – or the systematic study of texts and the meanings 
and ontology’s they produce – Phillips et al. (2004) construct a more nuisanced view of 
the dynamics of institutionalization in which, actions produce texts, that produce 
institutions, that then produce further actions and further texts. They start from the 
assumption (as Barley and Tolbert also begin) that researchers are most likely to observe 
the reframing of existing institutions, rather than the birth of new ones; as  most 
institutions are deeply historically entrenched and new institutions are a rarity. (This is 
certainly true of the RE, which represents both an ancient social and market institution; 
and a long standing embedded psychological trait – see: Bromley 1993). It is only within 
extraordinary frame-breaking moments of crisis and struggle that institutions are 
overturned through radical, dialectical change (Barley and Tolbert 1997). Even then, it is 
questionable that attempts to vanquish institutions actually work. More often than not, 
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institutional change happens as an emergent process, through time (Barley and Tolbert 
1997). 
 Phillips et al. (2004: 640, quoting Taylor and Van Every 2000: 289) argue that 
discourse and specifically texts that “leave traces” play a significant role in emergent 
processes of institutional change;  helping to frame and reframe institutions; and in doing 
so, set the stage for variations in existing forms of action.  The model that Phillips et al. 
(2004) produce to further this claim, seems to begin with the antecedent institutions that 
support and underscore prevailing hegemonies and behaviours. These antecedent 
institutions alter and begin to change dynamically, because they are threatened; actions 
arise as a protective measure; texts are generated to help preserve the institution by 
changing it; and the outcome is an institutional shift. These ideas are well rehearsed 
elsewhere within institution theory: see for instance, Oakes et al. (1998). What Phillips et 
al. (2004) provide us with, nonetheless, is a way into to seeing institutionalization and 
institutional change as dynamic processes, which owe much of their dynamism to 
discourse; and discursive interactions.  
 This observation is highly salient to the research at hand. REs are, I believe, 
created and sustained, by discursive interaction, and principally, actors’ engagement in, 
and with, Reputational Dialogues (RDs). These dialogues (which are rarely researched) 
seem to me to play a pivotal part in the creation of the REs as organization institutions 
(see: Bromley 1993) but that before an RE can be created other reputationally-related 
discourse framed institutions need to exist. The literature on REs, suggests, for example, 
that story plays an important role in communicating subjective reputational knowledges 
between actors (Bromley 1993). This same may also be true for rhetoric. Could these 
vehicles represent institutions, and institutionalizing forces in their own right? 
 Importantly, one might also foresee incidences when Reputational Storylines 
(RSs) and Reputational Rhetoric (RRs) enter into the moment of decision-making; and 
are utilized, along with other stimuli, to justify and legitimate a particular path of action. 
It is also arguable, that it is in this moment of ‘use’ that RSs and RRs produce REs. An 
attempt has been made in Figure 1, to capture the discursive, story telling, rhetorical, 
interpretative mechanisms that may underscore processes of RE formation.  
 The above represents a deliberately contentious sketch of some assumptions that 
are explored within the remainder of the article. Here, what I propose to do is to explore 
the BRI case to surface observations of RD, RSs, RRs, and REs (ostensibly using a 
grounded approach – Glaser and Strauss 1967) that I hope will encourage further debate. 
This, essentially, represents a grounded exploratory endeavour to see whether the notion 
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of ‘story-telling and rhetoric as ciphers’ for REs is efficacious; and if so, how it plays out 
within complex a real world organizational setting such as the BRI disaster, where (1) 
reputation represented a pressing strategic and competitive issue; and (2), because of this 
salience, actors engaged in forms of talk and writing where reputation was often the 
‘object’ (Parker 1992); and (3) where reputation was either central to, or background 
component of, dominant organization discourses (i.e. those created by managers and 
leading medical professionals).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]. 
 
 
The Relevance of the BRI Case 
At first, the BRI tragedy may appear tangential to the interpretative study of REs, and 
their foundations in discourse. In this section of the article, I explore why the case is 
actually an apposite case for such an endeavour.  
 RDs play an important role in the shaping of organizational, market, and actor 
relations within healthcare. Changes in reputation and status (whether good or bad) can 
dramatically alter the ability of a hospital, medical contractor, or individual practitioner to 
attract referrals, contracts with ‘health purchasers’, commercial sponsorship, research 
funding and charitable patronage. While there have been studies within organization 
theory of the effects these discourses and dialogues have upon relations between 
contractors in health markets (see ostensibly: Flynn et al. 1996; Ferlie et al. 1996); there 
has been little or no research thus far to document the workings of these RDs within 
complex health organizations, such as a modern NHS Trust, or, as in this case, the BRI 
and its parent NHS Trust – the United Bristol Healthcare Trust (or “UBHT”). 
Much has been made of the ways in which the principal actors in the BRI disaster, 
heart surgeons Mr. James Wisheart and Mr. Janardan Dhasmana, and their medical and 
managerial colleagues, became ‘entrapped’ or ‘encased’ by false sensemaking; denial of 
the situation; and a failure to recognise that clinical practices were placing lives at risk 
(see: ‘the Kennedy report 2001’; Weick and Sutcliffe 2003). The disaster literature per se 
would see the causes of this perceptual faltering as predominantly cultural (Weick and 
Sutcliffe 2003; also, indirectly, Brown and Jones 2000). While this is not in dispute, 
organizational cultures are composed of many things – including shared beliefs and forms 
of sensemaking that may have been shaped by engagements with and exposures to, 
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numerous organizational discourses and dialogues, including RD; and the impressions 
and images they create (Bromley 1993).  
 Furthermore, it is arguable that the themes of reputation, and reputation building 
were central to the tragedy. During the public inquiry that followed the BRI disaster, 
witnesses attested to how important securing a reputation for excellence in adult and 
paediatric cardiovascular surgery had become for the medical and surgical professionals 
involved in the tragedy; and how this search for excellence became a critical 
organizational and strategic issue for the BRI’s parent NHS Trust – the United Bristol 
Healthcare Trust (UBHT). Transcript data also points to major fissures within this 
community, which partly arose from disagreements about the reputation, status and ergo, 
the safety of the BRI versus other UK and international hospitals, particularly those 
thought to in the vanguard of cardiovascular surgery and cardiovascular medicine.  
 Whilst the UK NHS may have ‘moved on’ since the BRI disaster,  the case 
nevertheless  has much to say about the ways in which actors interact with powerful 
organizational discourses and dialogues, such as RD; but also those associated with 
transformational change, performance enhancement, excellence, and at a broader level, 
the NPM. The lessons provided by the BRI disaster are highly relevant, moreover, to the 
contemporary NHS scene, within which it has become of paramount importance for 
hospitals, NHS Trusts and, in particular, the new, controversial, generation of 
‘Foundation Hospitals’ to show that they are working towards achieving excellence in 
clinical care, clinical research, and organizational effectiveness and efficiency (Mueller et 
al. 2004).  
 NHS Trusts (and hospitals allied to them) are thus increasingly engaging in (1) 
‘targeted changes’ that they hope will magnify their reputation, and ‘brand image’; and 
(2) the kinds of jockeying for position that institutional economists sometimes refer to as 
‘reputational gaming’(see: Wilson 1985; and Raub and Weesie 1990; for simulations of  
reputational gaming in abstracted markets). There is, at present, very little research to 
record either the ways in which this ‘ratcheting-up’ of the ‘reputational game’ is being 
played out within NHS Hospitals Trusts; or the effects it is having upon organizational 
discourses, dialogues, sensemaking, and action. 
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Fieldwork and Methodology 
 
Fieldwork 
The fieldwork for this study is drawn from a broad analysis of texts from a public inquiry 
into the BRI disaster, held in Bristol and London, circa 1998-2001. The findings of this 
inquiry were published in the UK in 2001 (see: the ‘Kennedy Report’ 2001). The article 
synthesizes part of the fieldwork from this project - which has involved the content 
analysis of 69 transcripts, that recount testimony from approximately 74 witnesses, who 
gave evidence to the inquiry during a programme of public hearings held in Bristol, 
between March and December, 1999.  
 The aim of the research began as one of surfacing actors’ cognizance and 
sensemaking of the disaster (Gephart 1993; Weick 1993; Brown and Jones 2000; Brown 
2004), but, over time, this objective altered to one of understanding the role discourses, 
and in particular, Reputational Dialogues (RDs) played in influencing and altering the 
disaster’s trajectory. Theoretical observations of what Phillips et al. (2004) describe as 
‘discursive institutionalization’ have been honed from a process of reviewing these 
dialogues, as they are reproduced, and made sense of, within the transcripts.  
 
 
Methodology 
Organizational Discourse Analysis (ODA) has, of late, entered into a period of sustained 
resurgence - see, for example, recent commentaries by Boje et al. (2004); Grant and 
Hardy (2004); and Chia (2000). Studies situated within this genre of organizational 
research tend to rely on methods such as conversational analysis (Psathas 1995; 
Pomerantz and Fehr 1997; Iedema et al. 2004); narrative deconstruction (Brown 2004); 
and less often, ‘content analysis’ (Boje et al. 2004) to explore language, its construction, 
‘patternation’, and meanings it attributes within organizational settings. ODA studies 
focus on the way texts (and the actors producing them) express, reify, legitimize, 
condone, reject, or “rule in” and “rule out” particular forms of thinking and action (Grant 
and Hardy 2004; Phillips et al. 2004 quoting Hall 2001:72). ODA thus primarily involves 
the study of the ways in which discourses (and the texts and dialogues associated with 
them) influence sensemaking and action (see, for example: Iedema et al. 2004). Often 
ODA is teamed with Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to produce studies of actor 
sensemaking, which reveal the hidden workings of institutions of power and control; and 
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with this hegemony, and inequality within organizations (Zanoni and Janssens 2004; 
Fairclough 1995). 
 This study of RD is foregrounded within the ODA tradition. While the study has 
involved a broad analysis of textual materials generated by the inquiry, including 
commissioned reports, the final report of the inquiry itself, evidence and where 
appropriate, witness statements, it has focused primarily on the ‘content analysis’ of  
witness transcripts (n=69, from a possible sample of 74). Content analysis has been 
criticized, in the past, for tending to produce overly-descriptive and rigid results 
(Silverman 1993). While this may be true of its uses in past research contexts, it served a 
useful purpose in this study: enabling the researcher to trace discursive threads within 
complex, lengthy and idiosyncratic transcripts that did not naturally avail themselves to 
conversational or narrative deconstruction (Brown 2004). Content analysis was, in many 
ways, one of few qualitative research methods which could be applied to trace these 
threads competently, within such a large and differentiated data sample. 
 The textual analysis of the transcripts followed a ‘grounded approach’ (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990); beginning with a broad survey of the ‘text’ with 
the transcript for each day’s hearing (n=74). Computerised notes were produced for each 
transcript, together with a series of short ‘theoretical memos’ (Brown 2004; see also: 
Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990). A series of data tables were then 
compiled.  ‘Reputational comments’ appeared as one of the core thematic headings within 
the table. Other headings included ‘audit’ ‘disclosure’ ‘management’ and ‘sensemaking 
of the situation’. This helped to identify 69 days and around 74 ‘witness accounts’ where 
reputation emerged as a significant theme. The final sample was then analysed for content 
a second time. This simple process of content analysis helped to identify patterns of RD 
utilization that might otherwise have remained hidden.  
 It is acknowledged that there are some important limitations to both the data, and 
the uses to which it may be put. The witness testimony (from which the data has been 
compiled) provide us with contradictory, emotion-laden, and autobiographical ‘snapshots’ 
of life within the BRI and the tragedy which unfolded there. Witnesses to the inquiry gave 
evidence under intimidating conditions, and were required to reconstitute pictures of their 
sensemaking after a long period of time has elapsed, when memories of the disaster had 
eroded and, in some instances, become confused or complicated by what they have seen 
and heard since from other actors, and in the media. The transcripts do not therefore 
represent ‘normalised conversance’ but ‘speech under scrutiny’ (Fairclough 1995; 
Silverman 1993). These transcripts were, furthermore, ‘constructed’ within a formal 
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institutional setting and a courtroom steeped in the etiquette and majesty of the British 
legal system. In this instance, the inquiry courtroom was also a meeting place for two 
professional institutions: the legal profession and the medical profession. The ‘languages’ 
of both groups are play-out conspicuously within the transcripts. 
 The transcripts remain publicly available via the internet and it is thus possible to 
verify this research by visiting the inquiry’s website. Quotations and inferences have been 
faithfully reproduced. The sample, whilst not fully representative of all witnesses, is 
nevertheless valid as it draws on a high proportion of the transcripts and it is possible to 
see, within the sample, the replication from actor to actor of commensurate forms of 
sensemaking. The potential for unconscious researcher bias and selectivity has also been 
taken into account.  
 The outcomes of the analysis, are not, however, immediately generalizable to 
other organizational situations, public inquiries or disasters. Nor do they enable us to 
comment on the linguistic construction of RDs. What the results do reveal, however, are 
some insights into actors utilization of RDs in their sensemaking; and with this, the direct 
and indirect bearings RDs may have had upon the tragedy, amongst the many other 
factors which have been identified within ‘normative reanalyses’ of the case (the 
‘Kennedy Report’ 2001; Weick and Sutcliffe 2003). 
 
 
Reputation Dialogues, Rhetoric, (and the Stories and Beliefs) they  
Created about the BRI 
This section of the article concentrates on the emergence, within the transcripts, of RDs 
that focused on the BRI, and its reputation as (1) a provider of cardiac services to adults 
and children in the south-west of England; and (2) a centre for innovation in paediatric 
cardiac surgery. These RDs, evolved between multiple actors, who were caught-up in the 
tragedy at different intervals in its unfolding, between 1984 and 1995. Alongside this, the 
data reveals the extent to which RDs gave rise to powerful Rhetoric’s of Reputational 
Comparison (RRCs), which were intertwined with, and kept ‘in play’ persistent 
Reputational Storylines (RSs) about the BRI. There were also a number of important 
Reputation Effects (REs) illustrated within the data. REs represented courses of action 
which were either directly or indirectly influenced by actors’ engagement in RDs; and, by 
dint, RRCs and RSs. It is argued here that REs represent the ‘bridging point’ between the 
sphere of language, discourse, story, and rhetoric; and the sphere of action. It is also 
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arguable that some of these REs helped to define and shape the sensemaking and actions 
of those caught in the tragedy. Figure 2 represents this process. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
 
 
Context 
 
Funding Changes 
Before looking at patterns of RD, rhetoric, stories, and their effects in turn, it is worth 
exploring some points of context. The tragedy can be traced back to the reform of the 
market for Paediatric Cardiac Surgical services (hereafter referred to as PCS) in 1983-84; 
and the creation at that time of a centralized government funding scheme (known as the 
Supra Regional Services scheme – SRS) that encouraged hospitals engaged in PCS work 
to bid for ‘centre of excellence’ status. As the following analysis reveals, the PCS 
specialty emerged from this period of change as an environment predominated by RRCs  
within which comparisons of ‘excellence’ and ‘non-excellence’ become a central 
preoccupation.  
 
Changes within the Local Health Economy 
Changes to the organization and management of the local health economy, and the 
creation of the UBHT as a ‘first wave’ NHS trust also contextualised the tragedy. Under 
the auspices of the trust’s Chief Executive, Dr. John Roylance, the UBHT became an 
early pioneer of ‘doctors into management’ (Thorne 2000). Hospitals within the trust, 
including the BRI, underwent a radical NPM-style transformation (Ferlie et al. 1996; 
McNulty and Ferlie 2004). However, these changes appear to have left old medical 
hierarchies and cultures intact (see: ‘the Kennedy Report’ – 2001).  
 
Clinical Data 
The tragedy also took place at a time when routine ‘process and outcome’ data  were hard 
to come by within the PCS speciality; British PCS centres were not required to disclose 
information about clinical safety and performance; and the quality of surgical outcomes 
were considered difficult to benchmark (see: day 60, evidence of Professor Marc de 
Leval). There was, as a result, something of a ‘data vacuum’ within specialities aligned to 
PCS. Surgeons and cardiologists associated with PCS were extremely guarded about their 
 14
results and did not, as a rule, publicize negative outcomes (see day 84, testimony of Mr. 
Janardan Dhasmana). Past personal experience was seen as the best ‘yardstick’ a surgeon 
or cardiologist could use to judge the quality and reliability of their own work.  
 
 
The Medico-Culture within PCS 
As a medico-surgical discipline, PCS brought together a community of diverse actors that 
is to say cardiac nurses, surgeons, cardiologists, anaesthetists, and the ‘perfusionists’ who 
run heart bypass machines in surgical theatres. Notably, specialty demarcations lines were 
maintained between these groups of professionals (the idea of multidisciplinary team 
working being somewhat in its infancy). Actors in the PCS field, did however, invest 
great store in the relationships with those they had trained with, or worked alongside, 
within their respective medical ‘firm’.  
 
Knowledge of Performance at PCS Centres 
It seems from the data, that actors formed opinions about the performance of their PCS 
service versus others mostly via informal and anecdotal mechanisms such as talking to 
one another in meetings, sharing gossip and hearsay with immediate ‘likeminded’ 
colleagues; reading medical publications; and by judging their own performance against 
what they knew of the ‘national picture’. Statistical performance data was crude and 
unreliable at the time, and generally mistrusted (see: Spiegelhalter 1999; 2000). Crucially, 
in this ambiguous environment, actors could not hope to make accurate judgements about 
their own clinical performance or the performance levels attained at other PCS centres. 
This also meant that performance and safety records could not be authoritatively 
scrutinized nor challenged. 
 
Main Findings 
 
The Use of Reputational Rhetoric 
The transcripts suggest that surgeons and cardiologists within the PCS specialty used talk 
about reputation a great deal and were both participants in, and producers of, dialogues 
involving RRCs. Primarily, actors utilized RRCs to judge the ‘state of play’ within the 
field; and to establish a sense of their own position within it. REs and RSs were both 
grounded in, and fed into, these RRCs. Overall, it is argued here that RRCs were pivotal 
in shaping some of the central reputational images, impression and stories that may have 
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influenced actors’ sensemaking of the BRI’s PCS service and the risks it presented. The 
analysis also points to the emergence of four sets of REs and RSs which were grounded 
within, and contributed to, these RRCs. A full account of REs and RSs is depicted in 
Table 1.  A discussion of key highlights from this table and, what it illustrates, now 
follows. 
 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
 
Table 1 shows how each RE was constructed upon a series of storylines that created 
persistent images and impressions of the BRI and other PCS centre’s reputations. 
 
 
 
RE 1: ‘Symbolic Hierarchies’ and League Table Analogies 
 
RE 1 involves a series of persistent images, impressions and stories of the comparative 
standing of British and overseas PCS centres, which arose from the exchange of four 
discernable RSs [see: RS 1-4].  The reputations of these centres were compared, 
foremostly, using a ‘league table’ analogy – (see for instance witness contributions on 
days:  10, 12, 14, 15, 18, 21, 29, 31, 50, 64, 70, 87, 88, 89, and 94). Witnesses described 
how the PCS specialty was (and remains) divided between ‘elite’ and ‘non elite’ centres 
[RS 2]. The BRI was, by most estimations, a non-elite centre [RS 3]. 
  In the illustration shown below, on day 13, Department of Health (DoH) official, 
Dr. Norman Pryde-Halliday uses the metaphor of a ‘star that does not shine’ to denote 
feelings about the BRI’s standing within the PCS speciality. Note the way in which he 
assumes this is a consensus view and the comparisons which are made between the BRI 
and the ‘elite centre’ at Harefield: 
 
 
Quotation 1 
Q. Can you help me with the whole question of geographical considerations and weakness? Is what you 
are saying that the track record in terms of numbers of operations done was not really a justification for 
Bristol becoming a supra-regional centre? 
 
A. Well, it certainly did not perform anything like on a par with the other units, no. 
 
Q. It is very difficult to see how three open heart operations would justify that? 
 
A. Well, if you look at those figures again, you will see it actually goes 10, 11, 3, and so on, so there 
might have been a good reason, a management reason, for only doing 3 that year. 
   
Q. But if one took 10, which was the highest it had been before 1984? 
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A. If you take 10, then you would have to look at outstanding units such as Harefield, who only did 
about 10 in those years. 
 
Q.  What then did you mean by "weakness?" 
 
A. It was a small unit. They were not doing many operations. My division kept close contact with all 
the professions within the various specialties, and attending meetings of the Society and the College 
when dealing with paediatric cardiac surgery and cardiology, 
Bristol did not actually shine as a star, whereas many of the other units such as Birmingham, Harefield, 
Brompton, Guy's, GOS, would stand out, so it did not seem to be one of the leading lights in this area. 
 
Q. "Shine as a star" in what sense? 
A. In terms of clinical work that was going on there, in terms of research, in terms of the results that 
they were getting. 
 
Q. So we have a unit which is doing a small number, and you say it may well correspond with 
Harefield at 10, but obviously not at 3, a unit where the view was -- I will come back to the evidence 
for that in a moment -- that it was not a star; and the basis that you are telling me was decided by the 
Group to designate Bristol was geography? 
 
 
Often it was a matter of ‘atmospherics’ rather than any real notion of performance that 
separated elite centres from the non-elite [RS 4]. As the quotation from day 18, evidence 
of Professor David Baum, illustrates, excellent/elite centres were thought to ‘mark 
themselves out from the rest’. Note also the role played by gossip and grapevines in 
disseminating stories and beliefs about reputation: 
 
 
Quotation 2 
Q.  So when you say it is based on a general atmospheric judgment of "This person is a good guy; this 
person is not such a good guy", what information actually lies behind those judgments? 
 
A.  Many strands. They would include a reputation of diagnostic skills.  And how does that reputation 
get about?  Well, there are the value of clinical meetings, the value of first- and second-hand 
discussions, the gossip network.  So there would be diagnostic skills; there would be matters of 
professional courtesy; again, the gossip vine of how they are with parents who are worried about their 
sick child; how they are in terms of their relationship with their firm, with their juniors, as trainers, with 
their colleagues…. 
 
 
In sum RE 1, and the RSs connected with it, framed actor’s conceptions of (1) the ‘state 
of play’ within PCS, as an international specialism; (2) how ‘star centres’ were ‘leading 
the game’; and (3) the actions that would need to be taken in order to improve on, or 
maintain their ‘ranking’. RE 1 was therefore embedded within, and energised by, 
dialogues and stories shaped by engagements with RRCs. 
 
 
 
 
 17
RE2: the ‘Ratcheting up’ of Pressures to ‘be Excellent’ 
 
RE 2 involved impressions and images of what made a UK ‘centre of excellence’.  RE 2 
followed the reform the British market for PCS work (c. 1989-1984) and the creation of 
nationally funded ‘centres of excellence’ via the SRS funding scheme. In [RS 5] 
witnesses described the impact this had upon the speciality – how it was a mark of 
distinction to be awarded SRS funding; the competitions and rivalries it set up; and the 
sense of injustice felt by clinicians whose bids for SRS funding had been rejected and 
where therefore working outside of the scheme. Several witnesses also alluded to ‘empire 
building’ by hospitals and leading clinicians both within and outside of the SRS scheme 
[RS 6] - see for instance evidence from days: 12, 13 and day 61. A further reputational 
storyline [RS 7] focuses on Bristol, and consternation over the BRI’s designation as a 
‘centre of excellence’ in PCS (c. 1984-1994); and concerns about the quality of service it 
provided when compared to other centres of paediatric cardiac care in Cardiff, Leicester, 
Oxford, and Southampton.  
 A further storyline, [RS 10], comprised of stories concerning proliferation, 
attempts to control the numbers of hospitals carrying out PCS surgical work; the failure of 
the SRS funding scheme; and its replacement with ‘purchasing and providing’ in 1994. In 
this storyline, actors came to see ‘purchasing and providing’ as a system which could 
allow the better PCS centres to trade on reputation and allow under performing centres to 
naturally fall be the wayside (see for instance evidence provided on days: 11, 12,  and 
13). Overall, RE 2 encouraged actors to make judgements about, and question the 
legitimacy of, the decision to fund PCS work at the BRI, as a ‘non-elite’ centre. 
 
 
RE 3: Reputation and Sensemaking about the ‘Dangers’ of Surgery at the BRI 
RE 3 is extremely important to the case, and centres impressions, stories and images of 
safety, hazard and risk. A storyline emerges from the transcripts involving health officials 
and planners employed within regional, local, and national tiers of the NHS and the DoH 
[RS 11] and the use of reputational rhetoric to try to increase referrals to the BRI; 
improve its publicity; and relieve waiting list problems.  
 The transcripts also raise a further storyline about concerns and rumours heard in 
planning and administrative tiers of the NHS; and of direct ‘tip-offs’  that went unheeded 
(see days 67 and 80:  Dr. Bolsin’s attempt to ‘tip-off’ two officials at the DoH). Several 
actors describe how they decided not to act or deferred action because the rumours they 
had heard seemed neither real nor credible [RS 12]. This is illustrated, for example, in the 
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following extract from day 21 evidence of Professor Gareth Crompton, who is asked to 
comment on criticisms levelled by emeritus cardiologist, Professor Andrew Henderson, in 
a document circulated in Wales in 1986:  
 
Quotation 3 
Q. He refers, then, to referrals to centres without adequate surgery, and his view of 
Bristol is at page 6. We can see it in paragraph 9: 
 
"It has been suggested elsewhere that Bristol provide [the service] ... Moreover, it is 
no secret that their surgical service is regarded as being at the bottom of the UK 
league for quality, and it is difficult to see how this problem could be resolved in the 
foreseeable future." Those are fairly strong words about fellow professionals 
operating not far away, are they not? 
  
A. They are indeed. 
 
Q. Did you speak to him about those words? 
 
A. I was aware of his privately expressed views before this time. The problem was 
that he never ever offered me, or any of my colleagues, anyone in the Welsh Office, 
any evidence as to why he held these views; and in the absence of evidence, one 
would presume that what he had was hearsay. It was no basis for us, indeed, to advise 
the Secretary of State for Wales to ignore the strong policy advice which the 
Department of Health in London were getting, and in the reasoning behind the 
creation of the small number of supra-regional centres. 
 
 
This rhetoric hung on a belief that the BRI was a low ranking centre with potential and 
that its problems were a matter of throughput, not quality [RS 13].   
 Witnesses, both within and outside of the BRI, recognised that it was ‘generally 
thought of’ as being at the bottom of the league, and therefore ‘open to challenge’ for its 
referral base [RS 14 ]. This directs us towards [RS 15]: the impact reputation had upon 
the referral choices of clinicians. Throughout the period of interest to the inquiry (c. 1984-
1995), the BRI’s throughput of infant PCS cases was far lower than at other centres (see: 
Aylin et al. 2001; Spiegelhalter 1999; 2000). This was thought to have resulted from 
historic ties between clinicians in the south west and cardiac centres in London, 
Southampton and Birmingham (see for example: days 13 and 58); and the fact that the 
BRI was more expensive than, for example, centres in London (see: evidence of Mr. 
Graham Nix, days 22 and 23).  
Importantly, both referring clinicians and parents were persuaded to either choose 
or discount the BRI as a potential treatment centre according to the RS’s they heard (see 
again parents’ evidence: transcripts 1-5).  
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  In [RS 18], a storyline emerges in which developing a national profile in PCS 
became symbolically important within the BRI, from around 1969 onwards (see days: 78 
and 94). Mention is also made within the transcripts of hopes that the BRI would 
eventually become a centre for heart transplantation [RS 19] (see days: 33 and 90); and 
attempts to recruit an academic figurehead in PCS surgery to a chair at the Trust (see 
days: 30, 40, 61, 63, 69, 77 79, 81, 88, 89, 90, and 94).  
 After 1991-2, a belief generated that cardiac services could be the Trust’s “jewel 
in the crown” (See: evidence of Dr. John Roylance, UBHT Chief Executive, day 26). The 
winning of SRS ‘centre of excellence’ status was thus seen an important accolade of 
distinction for the trust, and ‘established clinicians’ working within the BRI and the 
Bristol Royal Hospital for Sick Children (BRHSC) [RS 20].  
 A further reputation storyline, [RS 21], deals with the development, over many 
years of a ‘halo effect’ that persuaded some established clinicians at the BRI/BRHSC to 
feel more confident about their performance and the quality of services they provided 
than was actually merited (see: ‘the Kennedy Report- 2001’, also Weick and Sutcliffe 
2003). The transcripts contain lengthy discussions of this issue, and how leading 
cardiothoracic surgeons’ Mr. James Wisheart and Mr. Janardan Dhasmana - played down 
the significance of adverse surgical outcomes at several points in the development of the 
tragedy: in 1986-87 when complaints about the service came to light in Wales; when Dr. 
Bolsin began vocalising his concerns in 1989-90; on the publication of several scathing 
attacks on the service in Private Eye magazine (c. 1992); and when problems began to be 
talked about by wider audiences in Bristol, the cardiac fraternity, the NHS and national 
news media (c. 1992- 1995).  
 A storyline also emerges in which surgeons at the BRI attempted to develop 
parity with surgeons at other centres [RS 23]. This search for parity encouraged Wisheart 
and Dhasmana to introduce new techniques such as the neo-natal and infant arterial 
switch operations - but into a context where these innovations could not be sustained 
without major additional investments in the service and retraining. When problems were 
encountered they were attributed them to the affects of a ‘learning curve’ - that it was 
assumed other centres which had introduced the switches were also going through [RS 
24]. 
The surgeons did not recognise that their experiences were adrift from the rest of 
the specialty – but this is perhaps to be expected, given the contexts and cultures of the 
time. Assumptions were also made about the case mix of the BRI, which was thought to 
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be more complex and high risk than at other centres [RS 25]. This belief has since been 
revealed as something of a myth (see: Aylin et al. 2001; Spiegelhalter 1999 and 2000).  
Established clinicians at the BRI also invested great faith in local experience – 
basing their sense of well-being and progress ‘in the here and now’ upon the currency of 
past successes [RS 26]. The centre demonstrated excellent results for simple open and 
closed operations. Principal consultant surgeon James Wisheart had pioneered the 
introduction of the Doppler technique into Britain in the late 1970s (see day 80, evidence 
of Dr. Stephen Bolsin). The storyline here is thus one in which past track records 
provided false comfort.  
 The sensemaking of established clinicians and managers at the BRI was 
fundamentally challenged by the arrival of ‘new entrant consultants’ from other adult 
cardiac and PCS centres (c. 1988-1995). The storyline which emerges from this involves 
a clash of mindsets between new and established consultant staff (RS 27 - see days: 63, 
80, and 72). Critically, new entrant consultants began to compare practices at the BRI 
with those of other centres they had worked for and trained at, including the ‘elites’. 
‘New entrant consultants’ were able to spot out-dated and potentially dangerous practices 
that were not obvious to established clinicians and managers (see: days: 61, 63, 72, 74).  
 
 
Quotation 4 
As an illustration of this, on day 63, cardiothoracic consultant, Mr. Bryan, comments on 
the culture he found at the BRI. Note how he identifies himself as part of the ‘new 
consultant group’ and the implied use of the ‘league analogy’:  
   
A. I think I would stand by that statement. In my view, at 
that time, a culture existed of explaining or justifying what I would see as mediocre or poor results on 
the basis of case severity, rather than directing attention to producing better results. 
 
Q. There were two paediatric cardiac surgeons? 
 
A. I think that I would not really say that necessarily applied to just paediatric cardiac surgery. I would 
say that applied to cardiac surgery: adult and paediatric. 
 
Q. In Bristol? 
 
A. Yes, I believe it did, yes. 
 
Q. Did it apply generally throughout the consultants who were there at that time, or is there anyone you 
would absolve from such a culture? 
 
A. Not really. I think I would stand by that. 
 
Q. Did that apply to Professor Angelini? 
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A. No, I think I am talking about -- he obviously did not  write this. You see, what happened in 1993, 
and I think that this is important, was that a group people and a significant number of people came 
from outside Bristol. That had not happened for some years. A group of people who had been 
practising both in surgery and in anaesthesia in a number of major centres throughout the world, all in 
different areas, and they would be Professor Angelini, myself, Dr Davies the anaesthetist and Dr Pryn. 
This was a group of people who all had had experience of contemporary cardiothoracic surgical 
practice in quite major international centres, and knew what could be achieved in cardiac surgery both 
in adults and in children. They were familiar with contemporary cardiac surgical practice. I believe that 
the people that were working in Bristol at the time were not that familiar with what could be achieved, 
because many of them had been there for some years, many of them had not had experience in 
contemporary cardiac surgical practice. 
 
It is fairly certain that the tragedy was lengthened by the intransigence that set in between 
new and established consultant groups, and an inability on the behalf of Mr. James 
Wisheart, and other established actors, to accept criticism from new colleagues (see: 
‘Kennedy Report’ 2001; Weick and Sutcliffe 2003).  
 Storyline [RS 28] involves a growing awareness of tensions within the consultant 
group and anxieties amongst nursing, managerial, and counselling staff. Several members 
of the BRI’s nursing staff described how they became aware that the BRI ‘lagged’ behind 
other centres in some aspects of clinical practice (see days: 32, 46 and 59, evidence of 
Sister Kay Armstrong).  
 Thus we have a picture of divided sensemaking within the BRI and the UBHT 
from around 1988 onwards– which was also reflected in ongoing discussions outside of 
Bristol (see RE 4, shown below). Importantly, established clinicians and to a certain 
extent, some managers and nurses, did not question the safety and reliability of their 
performance record until they were joined by colleagues from other centres in the PCS 
speciality (see for instance, testimony of Dr. Masey, day 74 line 58). Established actors 
seem also to have held on to an image of their reputation and the ‘state of play’ at other 
centres that was outdated. They had also seemingly lost touch with the direction of 
change within the speciality.  
 
 
 
RE 4: The Rumour Mill 
 
The ‘rumour mill’ played an extremely important role throughout the tragedy [RS 29], 
and was central to the garnering of concerns outside of the BRI/UBHT (c. 1984-1995).  
The evidence suggests that many actors outside of the BRI/UBHT heard conflicting 
rumours, ‘grumbles’ and inflammatory stories about the BRI over quite a long period of 
time (see, for example evidence of Catherine Hawkins CBE, day 56; and the evidence of 
Dr. Phil Hammond, day 64).Other witnesses do not appear to have been quite as well 
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‘networked’ into the professional grapevines that were actively disseminating gossip and 
hearsay (see days: 7, 18).  
 
Quotation 5 
Here, Dr. Phil Hammond, comments on his knowledge of rumours about the BRI. Note 
that he was the author of a series of articles published in Private Eye, and thus heavily 
instrumental in publicizing the case. Note also the use of ‘consensus’ to justify 
interpretation: everybody knew about Bristol, and, ergo, the stories must be true: 
 
A. I would also say that when I talked to people in other units, it was quite common for anaesthetists to 
be operating with a surgeon and to say, "Why has this baby  bypassed Bristol?" Over the years I have 
had this  general comment from the Hammersmith, Brompton, Guys, Southampton, Oxford and Cardiff 
as a sender, where anaesthetists have queried why babies are not going to Bristol. There have been 
some quite harsh comments  which I could not possibly repeat because I think they would be libellous, 
and there were some general comments that for this sort of operation, you do not go to Bristol, as in 
"everyone knows about Bristol". I do not think that people would necessarily know specific results for 
specific operations, but my general feeling at that time is that it was known within the community that 
it was not the place, for example, to send your own children. 
 
Witnesses were also asked to comment on two ‘conspiratorial aspects’ of the tragedy: the 
leaking of rumours about the BRI to the press and specifically Private Eye Magazine (see 
days 18 30, 61, 64, 66, and 76); and rumours of institutional collusion and Freemasonry 
(see days: 18, 62, and 80). The above were catalysed within a storyline about ‘whisper 
campaigns’ and ‘corridor conversations’ [RS 30].  
 
Finally, the activities of Dr. Stephen Bolsin – his clandestine audit and tendency to ‘talk 
openly’ with ‘likeminded people’ within and outside the BRI created a storyline of its 
own [RS 31]  - see days 24, 30, 32, 41, 46, 60, 61, 62,  64, 67, 69, 72, 74, 75, 76, 79, 80, 
81, 82, 83, 86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, and especially 59, 63, 87. His raising of concerns, 
circa 1989-1994, led to rumours and gossip within the BRI, which was then picked up by 
officials at the DoH; clinicians at other centres; and by journalists in the British media 
(see for example days: 64, 67, and evidence of doctors Doyle and Ashwell - day 87). Dr. 
Bolsin’s talk is thought to have fuelled many of the stories noted by Dr. Hammond and 
other witnesses. RE 4 thus incurred enormous effects upon perceptions of safety at the 
BRI (c. 1988-1995); and how professionals and parents appraised the risks entailed by 
surgery and post-operative care. 
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Comments on the Case 
Previous re-analyses of the BRI case have focused upon the operational and cultural 
antecedents of the disaster, and, in the case of the latter, the effects wrought by 
intransigence within the BRI/UBHT’s austere professional and organizational hierarchies 
(the Kennedy Report 2001; Weick and Sutcliffe 2003). In this article, an attempt has been 
made to add to this existing knowledge base via a consideration of the effects rendered by 
RDs, RRCs, RSs and concomitant REs, involving a wide and diverse audience of actors 
from both within, and without, the BRI / UBHT.  The research has traced the emergence 
of complex patternations of RDs, RRCs, RSs and REs, that spanned conventional 
organizational boundaries; and infused talk within numerous interpersonal actor 
networks.  
 Overall, the analysis points to the manifestation of four important REs and 31 RSs 
crafted upon and located within complex RRCs [see again: Table 2] across the timeframe 
of the disaster (c.1984-1995). RDs acted as creators of, and transmission belts for, the 
dissemination of this rhetoric, and associated REs and RSs. It is arguable, on this basis, 
that RDs represented important ‘discursive devices’ of institutionalization within the 
context of the tragedy (Phillips et al. 2004). So, for example, the rhetoric and storylines 
associated with RE 1, institutionalized perceptions of the excellence or otherwise of PCS 
centres, and helped identify the BRI as a non-elite, low ranking centre. In RE 2, witnesses 
described the effects reorganization of the market had upon the PCS speciality. This 
appears to have institutionalized the belief, amongst some actors, that the BRI was not a 
legitimate centre of excellence. Stories about the reputation of PCS at the BRI (whether 
good or bad) seem also to have influenced referral choices and perceptions of risk.   
 By the same token, RE 3 included a number of storylines in which images, 
impressions and stories centring on reputation were used to assess risk and judge safety. 
RE 3 also shows how ‘new entrant consultants’ at the BRI/UBHT worked with a 
different, more ‘contemporary’ reputational rhetoric than their established colleagues, and 
because of this, were better able to compare the quality gap between the BRI and other 
centres. This points to the existing of competing RDs (particularly after 1988) - one 
parochial and local to the BRI/UBHT; and the other situated in the ‘wider field’ of PCS. 
Critically, these RDs presented fundamentally different portraits of safety at the BRI. 
 Storylines associated with RE 4 illustrate the effects gossip, rumours, and an 
emerging sense of conspiracy had upon the tragedy. Storylines in RE 4 also show how 
damaging these rumours were to the reputations of established clinicians, managers at the 
BRI, and whistleblowers, such as Dr. Stephen Bolsin. Importantly, one can also note 
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changes in attitudes to gossip as the tragedy unfolded. To begin with, rumours and press 
speculation were regarded as libellous and unsubstantiated (c.1984-1993), but become 
more widely accepted and believed as time went on, and more actors began to raise 
concerns. We may also see at this juncture an emergent shift, as the old ‘parochial 
sensemaking’ associated with established clinicians was gradually censured and then 
replaced, by that of a new cadre of clinicians.  
 Taken in the round, the evidence points to an important reality: in hospital 
settings RRCs, RSs, REs, and dialogues about reputation represent powerful, image and 
‘impression-creating’ institutions. In the BRI case, these institutional forces appear to 
have firstly helped to institutionalize ‘local’ beliefs about quality, safety, risk  and 
standing (c. 1984 -1988); but also helped to alter them, after this ‘cut off point’ when a 
new corps of clinicians began to join the BRI/UBHT. RDs and their by-product seem also 
to have played a part in the decisions and choices made by clinicians – both established 
and new – and, crucially, the advice they then gave to parents of ‘special heart babies’. 
 
 
Theoretical Implications 
The study of organizational discourses and dialogues, and the contributions both make to 
the creation, promulgation, and institutionalization of the institutions that influence action 
is a developing discipline within organization theory (Phillips et al 2004; Barley and 
Tolbert 1997). This study has attempted to shed some initial light upon the workings of 
one form of institution (the RE); arguing that it is interpretatively founded, within RDs. 
The article has also attempted to show how these RDs may create stories, and forms of 
rhetoric upon which REs are predicated.  The study suggests, moreover, that REs 
represent the bridging points between talk and writing about reputation; the stories and 
rhetoric they produce; and sensemaking and action. The argue presented here is that REs 
come into existence when rhetoric and story are utilized ‘in the moment’ of decision-
making. These decisions then act as preludes for actions and inactions. RES, it is argued, 
are the end product of a process which involves at least two other institutions – namely 
story-telling about reputation; and reputational rhetoric.  The order in which these 
precursor institutions are produce may be interchangeable and context specific. Thus in 
the BRI case, we can conceive of a process of institutionalization that evolved along the 
following lines (see also Figure 2): 
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Stage 1: the evolution, over time, of ‘market related’ and professionally orientated 
patterns of RD (i.e. discussions about the quality of service provided by particular 
hospitals, the skills of a particular surgeon). 
 
Stage 2: the evolution, over time, of Rhetoric’s of Reputational Comparison (RRCs) in 
which the BRI’s reputation was compared, often unfavourably, to those of other UK and 
overseas hospitals providing care for ‘special heart babies’. RRCs represent ‘an 
institution’ because, in this instance, they encouraged conformity to particular ways of 
thinking about the BRI and its competitors; and created powerful and persistent images to 
support these processes. 
 
Stage 3: involved the development, and articulation, over time, of a series of Reputational 
Storylines (RSs) about standards of care afforded to both adult and paediatric cardiac 
patients the BRI. These stories fed into, but were also an intrinsic to these RRCs. 
Importantly, as an institution, RSs created persistent images and impressions of 
performance, that ‘stuck’ with actors. However, over time, RSs that supported beliefs that 
the BRI was safe were replaced by countervailing stories and images that encouraged 
actors to believe it was unsafe. RSs were thus important to both the institutionalization of 
the prevailing ‘local’ hegemony within heart surgery at the BRI; and its eventual 
redundancy. (One might suggest, tentatively, on this basis that observing changes in story 
telling within organizations could be a good way of charting institutional change).  
  
Stages two and three represent spaces in which powerful discourse-fashioned institutions 
were created, communicated, reproduced, and altered through the exchange of different 
forms of ‘text’ between actors. Talk was by far, but not always, the most powerful textual 
‘institutionalizing media’ operating within the organizational context of the BRI disaster.  
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Stage 4:  arose when stages two and three were combined. Together, the institutions 
conceived in stages 2 and 3 created REs – or powerful images and impressions that actors 
drew upon when making-sense of the ‘state-of-play’ at the BRI; and formulating 
judgements and courses of action (and inaction) based on this cognition.  
 
 
Contribution to Wider Research 
In relating this back to the wider institutionalization research, one can see within the BRI 
story, a general affirmation of Phillips et al. (2004) commentary on discourses and 
institutionalization. There is also a sense in which their model is played out in the story: 
an organization finds itself in crisis; and dominant institutions undergo change in order 
that they can survive. Old mind sets are rejected (or at least attenuated), over a long 
period of time; this is accompanied by concomitant changes in the discourses that 
prevailed at the UBHT; which now claims to be a transformed organization (Kennedy 
Report 2001). However, what this research really suggests it that there is scope for 
developing an interpretative, discourse-analytic take on institutionalization that 
recognises the power that story, rhetoric, and imagery have within these processes.  
Where RE research is concerned, the outcomes of this study suggest that it is possible to 
derive interpretative insights into a phenomena that has primarily been evaluated using 
mathematical and game theoretic approaches and methodologies. 
 
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
The reform and modernization of the UK NHS has been accompanied by a series of 
disasters which may lead us to doubt the salience and safety of the NPM project. In the 
UK NHS, hospital managers and clinicians are under increasing pressure to not only 
demonstrate evidence of good performance, but also ‘prove their worth’ and build 
excellent reputations. The NHS, alongside other areas of the NPM-reformed public 
services, is thus increasingly dominated by ‘league table-ism’. This may be creating a 
‘ratchet effect’ in which health organizations focus on doing what is necessary to 
impression manage perceptions of excellence, whilst in reality, services remain over-
stretched and at risk.  
 RDs exist naturally within health organizations – they are an important feature of 
the organizational discourses that pervade hospitals, and health markets, and are implicit 
to the social construction of relationships between actors in these settings, defining, for 
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example whether a doctor can be ‘recommended’ or not. However, this ‘natural’ state of 
affairs has been altered somewhat by the introduction of the NPM, and with it discourses 
and doctrines of performance, change, and excellence. The NPM has set up RDs which 
focus not just on the clinical merits of professionals and the health organizations for 
which they work, but are also imbued with notions of organization prowess; and 
expectations of excellence that many real world organizations find it hard to live up to. It 
is important for policy-makers to take on board these observations when setting up 
agendas for change and modernization (i.e. by taking note of the reputational pressures 
they create). 
 In the Bristol case, we have an early example of the effects the introduction of 
NPM, and concomitant notions of performativity and excellence have had upon the 
construction of RDs and the roles they serve within healthcare settings. While clinicians 
at the BRI may always have wanted to be seen in good or excellent light by their peers at 
other hospitals, the introduction of the SRS funding scheme (an NPM device), meant that 
reputation was associated more directly with funding rationale, from 1984 onwards. The 
case illustrates, in many ways, how issues of reputation and performativity are closely 
interwoven. There is a need for further research to explore this inter-relationship. This 
research might also seek to identify the mechanism that translate and turn the stories, 
images, and effects generated by RDs into concrete beliefs about reputation and 
performance; and further investigate how it is that these beliefs come to underline, 
suffuse, and be incorporated within, performance ‘league tables’.  
 
 
Note on Disaster Theory 
This article has attempted to show how  the RE, and related discursively fashioned 
institutions influenced, along with other stimuli, processes of sensemaking and decision-
taking in the BRI disaster. In particular, RDs, RRCs, RSs and REs, helped to create 
impressions and images of safety, risk, and quality that enabled established clinicians at 
the BRI to wrongly view their practices as safe. At the same time, new entrants to the 
BRI/UBHT were able to use their reputational knowledges to spot risks not seen by the 
established clinicians. This suggests that future research into disaster sensemaking, should 
include some form of analysis of the role played by ‘reputational institutions’ in creating 
sensory myopias. Furthermore, it is arguable that this research has implications for both 
notions of ‘success breeding failure’ Miller (1992) and Barry Turner’s (1976) work on the 
‘failure of foresight’ within bureaucratic (and post-bureaucratic) organizations. It is 
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reasonable to suggest that, in some circumstances the utilization of RRCs, RSs and REs 
might encourage organizations to overreach; overplay hands, create crises; and, in the 
worst scenarios, emancipate full blown disasters. Clearly, there is a need for further 
research to ascertain the strengths and limitations of this observation.  
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Table 1: Reputation Effects and Reputational Storylines  
Underlining the BRI Tragedy 
 
 
 
Reputation Effects 
(REs) 
Reputational Storylines (RSs) crafted in relation to a ‘Rhetoric of Reputational Comparisons’ 
RRC 
RE 1: ‘Symbolic 
Hierarchies’ and league 
table analogies 
RS 1- comparison of standing using a league table analogy 
 RS 2 - stories about elite centres 
 RS 3 - stories about ‘low ranking’ non-elite centres 
 RS 4 - a question of ‘atmospherics’ 
RS 5 - the impact of ‘centres of excellence’ RE 2:  the 
reorganization of PCS 
funding  RS 6 - empire building 
 RS 7 - questioning of the BRI’s status as a ‘centre of 
excellence’ 
 RS 8 -  the geographic argument 
 RS 9 - tolerating low throughput 
 RS 10 - proliferation 
 RS 11 -  planners dismiss concerns as politicking between 
centres 
These RSs were used within 
the transcripts to: 
 
- justify and defend 
decisions on  
funding 
 
- determine ‘notional 
assumptions’ about  
quality of care  
 
- identify the 
‘ranking’ of centres 
and surgeons  
within the specialty 
 
- explain why the 
BRI was thought to 
be at the bottom of 
the league/lagging 
behind 
 
-  explain why the 
BRI was treated as a 
special case 
 
- justify favourable 
treatment for  ‘elite’ 
centres 
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RE 3: sensemaking and 
recognition of dangers 
at the BRI 
RS 12 - Not acting on rumours 
 RS 13 - the BRI’ s problems were a matter of throughput, not 
quality 
 RS 14 - the BRI becomes open to challenge from rival centres 
 RS 15 - stories about referral decisions and reputation 
 RS 16 - higher volume centres were ‘safer’  
 RS 17 - the BRI treated a wider and more difficult case mix 
than other centres 
 RS 18 -  the symbolic virtues of having a national profile in 
PCS 
 RS 19 -  the symbolic virtues of becoming a transplantation 
centre 
 RS 20 - SRS status is seen as an accolade of distinction and 
merit/ the jewel in the crown metaphor 
 RS 21 -  the halo effect  
 RS 22 -  comparing track records in isolation 
 RS 23 - developing parity with surgeons at other centres 
 RS 24 -  the learning curve assumed to be happening 
elsewhere 
 RS 25 - the BRI was thought to be doing more complex and 
high risk cases than other centres 
 RS 26 -  past success provides false comfort 
 RS 27 -  ‘new entrant consultant’ start seeing gaps between 
the BRI and other PCS centres 
 RS 28 -  anxieties grow amongst managerial, nursing, and 
counselling staff 
Depending on the witness, 
these RSs were used to:  
 
- develop and fulfil 
strategic agendas 
 
- defend decisions to 
either intervene, 
not intervene or 
delay action 
 
And/or to: 
 
- defend 
interpretations of 
statistics and other 
sources of ‘data’ 
about safety, risk 
and performance 
 
- derive comfort; 
 
- explains concerns, 
‘emotional states’ 
and anxieties 
 
- defend, compare or 
criticise practices 
and cultures 
 
RE 4: the ‘rumour mill’ RS 29 – stories and gossip which circulated via the rumour 
mill or grapevine 
 RS 30 -  whisper campaigns and corridor conversations 
 RS 31 -  Dr. Bolsin’s comments create a reputation effect of 
their own.  
These stories were used to: 
 
- illustrate consensus 
and individual 
beliefs 
- show how concerns 
were dismissed/not 
taken seriously 
- explore how the 
situation magnified 
and became out of 
control 
- show how 
damaging rumours 
and accusations of 
conspiracy and 
wrongdoing 
affected referrals, 
contracts, relations 
between actors, 
emotional and 
cognitive states. 
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Figure 1: Reputational Dialogues (RDs) - Creation of  By-Products / Institutions 
 
Reputational 
Dialogues 
(RDs) 
Reputational 
Rhetoric  (RR) 
Reputational 
Storylines 
(RSs) 
Reputation 
Effects 
 
 
Key: Grey =  an institutional by-product of RD.  
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Figure 2: Reputational Dialogues (RDs) and the Institutionalization of RD 'By-Products' 
 
 
Rhetoric involving 
reputational comparisons REPUTATIONAL 
DIALOGUES (RDs) 
 
(a form which involves 
sharing experiences, 
rumours, myths and so 
on about the repute of a 
given actor or 
organization, embodied 
within texts produced in 
written and spoken 
forms) 
 
(seen in, for example, arguments 
for and against change) 
Reputational Storylines 
(RSs)  
 
(stories about an actor or 
organization’s reputation – used 
within rhetoric) 
Action 
 
 
 
 
Sensemaking
 
 
 
 
 
Cognition 
Reputation Effects (REs)  
 
(the effect yielded from 
interactions with RD, rhetoric, 
and RSs) 
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